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10.1 Introduction 
Governments usually adopt price controls to impose restrictions on the price of 
goods and services by employing the appealing argument that they are 
protecting the groups who find it difficult to meet increasing prices. Since ancient 
times, regulators have set maximum or minimum prices – price ceilings or price 
floors. A maximum price for bread was understood as a means to protect the 
poorest from starvation and the maximum price for house rents to protect them 
from becoming homeless. The minimum wage – the price floor for labor – was 
seen as a guarantee to prevent unskilled workers from falling below a minimum 
living standard. 
Nonetheless, many economists are skeptical about these mechanisms 
because they interfere with the natural operation of the market and distort the 
pattern of resource allocation. Additional objections sound not in utilitarianism 
but in moralism. By changing the prices that emerge from the free interaction of 
the participants on commercial exchanges, price controls pervert the 
relationship between price and worth. According to the moral objections, the 
former should reflect the latter for there to be a just exchange. Moreover, 
according to the objectors, price ceilings will, by definition, cause shortages, and 
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price floors will lead to surpluses, therefore ending up penalizing precisely the 
groups that price controls were intended to protect. As such, the imposition of 
price controls, apart from having unintended consequences, appears to violate 
the principle of justice in economic transactions. 
Price controls have been extensively discussed throughout the centuries, 
not only by economists, but by all sectors in society. In this chapter, we approach 
the question of price controls using a Christian framework, analyzing the 
arguments employed by recognized authors from various denominations. After a 
brief introduction, Section 10.2 explores the sources and origins of Christian 
thought on price controls and market economies, with a special emphasis on the 
medieval legacy, and in particular the thought and work of St. Thomas Aquinas. 
Section 10.3 discusses the main topic according to subsequent developments in 
Catholic thought, focusing mainly on late scholasticism, which was crucial in 
shaping Catholic views on economic issues in the transition to modernity. 
Section 10.4 approaches prices controls from the point of view of Protestant 
thought distinguishing between the perspective of three political economists – 
Pufendorf, Hutcheson, and Smith – and the perspective of Martin Luther. Finally, 
Section 10.5 concludes the argument, with an attempt to synthesize (at least to 
the extent common ground can be found) a general Christian position on price 
controls and market economies. 
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10.2 Sources and Origins of Christian Thought 
on Price Controls and Market Economies: The 
Medieval Legacy 
Concerns about the justice of prices practiced in markets are not new. They may 
ultimately be traced back to antiquity, when the first forms of economic 
exchange emerge. Christian thought on price controls and market economies 
traditionally drew on two major sources. The first was, of course, the biblical 
texts from which divine law was ascertained and interpreted. The second was 
the Aristotelian tradition, particularly the framework for dealing with justice in 
exchange relationships set up in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. As noted by the 
historian of medieval economic thought, Diana Wood: 
In his Nicomachean Ethics (v, v) Aristotle set up a model of 
justice in exchange which is fundamental to the idea of the just 
price. He did not discuss the just wage as such, because the society 
in which he lived was based largely on slavery, but his model 
generated ideas amongst later commentators which were 
applicable to both subjects. Aristotle’s real concern was to apply 
justice to exchange. In its widest sense he saw justice as a state of 
mind which disposed someone to act rightly. It was righteousness 
itself, and as such it was the epitome of all virtue. “Justice … is not a 
part of virtue, but virtue entire.” For him virtue consisted in a 
mean. The just or virtuous person was one who avoided all 
extremes, and whose disposition led him to apply the mean, or 
moderation, to his behaviour. Justice in the sense of righteousness 
4 
 
was a universal quality. When he discussed justice in exchange, 
however, his concern was with “particular” rather than universal 
justice – justice as applied to relationships between people.1 
It was during the Middle Ages, when economic life developed significantly, that 
the doctrine of just price became a principal concern for medieval writers. 
According to John Baldwin, the encapsulation of the medieval economy’s 
doctrine of just price was that “the just price was essentially determined by the 
cost of production … [and] consisted of the sum total of material costs necessary 
for producing goods plus a reasonable wage to maintain the craftsman or 
merchant in his appropriate station of life.”2 As such, the reward for the effort 
put forth by craftsmen or merchants in the production of goods was 
differentiated by and directly associated with their position in the social 
hierarchy. It was possible to make these distinctions because the medieval 
economy was organized within the guild system; it was generally static, 
consisting of local and small markets, a limited number of buyers, and a level of 
goods supply that was either elastic or known to all participants on economic 
exchanges. Guilds, Raymond de Roover clarifies, consisted of “welfare agencies 
which prevented unfair competition, protected consumers against deceit and 
exploitation, created equal opportunities for their members, and secured  
 
1 Diana Wood, Medieval Economic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), p. 133. 
2 John W. Baldwin, “The Medieval Theories of the Just Price: Romanists, 
Canonists, and Theologians in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries,” 
Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 49, no. 47 (1959), p. 7. 
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them a modest but decent living in keeping with traditional standards.”3 
Nonetheless, the quick and substantial progress in trade that took place 
between the eleventh and the thirteenth centuries – and which meant not only 
an increased number of commercial transactions but also the development of 
new financial tools – revived the debate about the justum pretium. And in the 
normative analysis of this economic question, three groups of medieval authors 
stood out: the Canon lawyers, the Roman lawyers, and the theologians. 
Classical Roman law evidently influenced medieval Roman lawyers, and, 
for that reason, the principle of freedom of bargaining played a fundamental role 
for them in the question of price determination. According to the free-bargain 
principle, as explained by Odofredus in his Lectura,4 sellers and buyers were free 
to negotiate and to offer different prices before agreeing upon a certain price. To 
complement this process, medieval Roman lawyers also revived and generalized 
a device from the Justinian Code known as laesio enormis, which established that 
the price could be rectified if it was below one-half of the just price.5 
On the other hand, discussion among Canon lawyers was dominated by 
the important concept of usury, which the Carolingian economic legislation 
 
3 Raymond de Roover, “The Concept of the Just Price: Theory and 
Economic Policy,” The Journal of Economic History, vol. 18, no. 4 (December 
1958), p. 418. 
4 Quoted in Baldwin, “The Medieval Theories of the Just Price,” p. 21. 
5 In its original form, laesio enormis was developed to protect sellers, but 
during the Middle Ages, Roman lawyers extended its benefits to buyers as well. 
As explained by Baldwin, this development can be seen as “a revolution which 
deposed the seller from his place of privilege and elevated the buyer to at least 
an equal position” (ibid., p. 27). 
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defined as “when more is demanded back than what is given.”6 Early Canonists7 
rejected any possibility of price profiteering and favored price regulation as a 
mechanism to protect both sellers and buyers from the abusive practice of usury. 
However, a few centuries later, the Decretists’ interpretations of the Decretum of 
Gratian introduced an important difference between profit – honestus questus, 
which resulted from labor and the expenses of craftsmanship and was necessary 
for self-support – and usury, turpe lucrum, which resulted from speculative sale 
and greed. William of Rennes later confirmed this, arguing in favor of a moderate 
profit (lucrum moderatum) and clarifying that gains were only sinful if 
conducted out of greed (cupiditas): 
Although business can scarcely be conducted without sin, 
merchants may receive a moderate profit from their ware for the 
maintenance of themselves and their families. Since they work for 
all and perform a kind of common business by transporting 
merchandise back and forth between fairs, they should not be held 
to pay their own wages. From the merchandise itself they can 
accept a moderate profit, which is regulated by the judgement of a 
good man, because the amount of profit permitted cannot be 
exactly determined in shillings, pounds, or pennies.8 
 
6 Ibid., p. 32. In this point, it is possible to identify the general suspicion 
toward merchants and mercantile activity that was inherited from the ancient 
Church Fathers, who believed that commercial activity was always a “morally 
risky business” (ibid., p. 14) because money enhances the chances of fraudulent 
and deceitful attitudes by all participants in the exchange. 
7 Referring to the period of the late eighth and ninth centuries and 
including the laws and canons of the Carolingian Empire. 
8 Quoted in ibid., p. 48. 
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But Romanists and Canonists were neighbors in Bologna, the center of the two 
legal systems at the time, and neither was immune to the influence of the other. 
Popes Alexander III and Innocent III introduced the device of laesio enormis into 
Canon law. For both systems, the just price was the current price; the price that 
goods currently fetched at a specific time and place. For this reason, the justum 
pretium resulted from a common estimation and fluctuated according to 
different localities or moments.9 There was also a coincident view of the problem 
of fraud (dolus), which was considered to be a deliberate misrepresentation of 
the quality or quantity of goods. 
Theologians did not seriously consider the question of just price until the 
thirteenth century; nonetheless, their intellectual accomplishments were even 
more remarkable than those achieved by medieval legists.10 Although not the 
first theologian advocating a just price of economic goods, Thomas Aquinas is 
often referred to as the father of the theory of just price because of his thorough 
 
9 Romanists developed a manual for estimatores, those who were 
responsible for determining the just price of goods The manual defined their 
duties to include “the determination of obligations between debtors and 
creditors, the appraisal of landed properties and their boundaries, the division 
among partners of things held in common, and the adjudicating of the right of 
way” (ibid., p. 28). Additionally, in his Lectura, Odofredus also established four 
standards for this estimation, the first and most important of which referred to 
the price that was “observed commonly,” in contrast to the price that arose “from 
the whim or needs of single individuals” (ibid., p. 28). Following the same 
methods, Canonists emphasized the importance of leaving individual affections 
aside from the estimation of just price, which should be the result of a common 
estimation. Bernard of Botone left the influence by Romanists very clear when he 
stated the formula “a thing is worth as much as it can be sold for” as being the 
Canonist definition of just price (ibid., 54). 
10 Ibid., p. 58. 
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exposition of the topic. His careful analysis of the subject can be found in 
Question 77: “By Sins Committed in Buying and Selling” of Secunda-secundae of 
his Summa Theologica. Reflecting the prevailing view that economics was part of 
justice, Aquinas’ objective was normative – to give a theoretical justification for 
the ethical character of prices. 
In his first article, Aquinas asserts that it is sinful to sell a thing for more 
than the just price. Doing so is a form of deceit and of injury to the other party 
involved in the transaction. He proceeds to distinguish two different ways of 
buying and selling: the first that tends to be advantageous for both parties and 
the second that tends to the advantage of one party and the disadvantage of the 
other. Explaining the former type of transaction, Aquinas asserts that all 
contracts “should not be more of a burden to one party than to another, and 
consequently all contracts between them should observe equality of thing and 
thing.”11 For this reason, when the price exceeds the quality of the thing or the 
quality exceeds the price, there is no equality of justice, and the sale is unjust and 
unlawful. In this case, “to fulfil the demands of equitable justice the contract price 
and the true economic value of goods must be equivalent.”12 It is by focusing 
merely on passages similar to these that some authors have concluded that 
Aquinas follows Marxian dialectics and establishes a theory of value in line with 
Karl Marx. This theory, however, is deconstructed by Roover, who accuses these 
authors of “selecting those passages favorable to their thesis”13 and of ignoring 
 
11 St. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province (Cincinnati: Benziger Bros., 1947), II, II, q. 77, art. 1, 
ad resp. 
12 Baldwin, “The Medieval Theories of the Just Price,” p. 72. 
13 Roover, “The Concept of Just Price,” p. 421. 
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other statements that completely contradict this theory, especially in the last 
article of Question 77. 
Aquinas’s second method of buying and selling, on the other hand, refers 
to those accidental situations “when a man has great need of a certain thing, 
while another man will suffer if he be without it.”14 Here, the just price will be 
defined not only by the economic value of the thing sold, but also by the loss 
imposed on the seller. For it is thus possible “to sell a thing for more than it is 
worth in itself,”15 but never for more than it is worth for the seller.16 Before 
concluding the article, Aquinas separates human law from divine law and 
clarifies that, according to the latter, there should be compensation for those who 
suffer loss from unlawful contracts. 
Defects in the thing sold are the main topic of Aquinas’s next two 
questions, with a three-part classification – the fault may regard the thing’s 
substance, its quantity, or its quality. In any case, Aquinas is very straightforward 
in affirming that if a sale is made with awareness of a fault, it is fraudulent and 
unlawful. But the same does not apply if the seller is not aware of the fault: “if 
any of the foregoing defects be in the thing sold, and he knows nothing about 
this, the seller does not sin.”17 Nevertheless, the buyer always has the right to be 
 
14 Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, II, II, q. 77, art. 1, ad resp. 
15 Ibid. 
16 On this point, Aquinas introduces two remarks that are important to 
understand the overall theory. If one person greatly benefits of the thing to be 
sold and if the seller does not suffer any loss by selling it, then the price shall not 
be raised, even though it is for the advantage of one party. Moreover, if a man 
buys something he considers to be to his great advantage, he may pay the seller a 
higher price for it; but the gesture belongs only to his honesty. 
17 Ibid., art. 2, ad resp. 
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compensated for the loss caused, even if the seller only learns of the defect after 
the sale is made. Another relevant point regarding the sale of faulty things 
respects the obligation of the seller to state the defects of the thing to be sold. If 
the seller acts otherwise, he would be giving someone “an occasion of danger or 
loss” and the contract would be fraudulent.18 
In the last article of the question, Aquinas addresses those situations 
where it is acceptable to sell a thing dearer than what the seller paid for it – the 
mark-up question. According to the author, exchange can be seen in two different 
ways, one by natural necessity – which he considers “commendable” – and the 
other one by profit, which he considers “deserving of blame.” Gains considered in 
themselves, in their nature, are neither virtuous nor sinful; it is the final objective 
of trading that determines their justness: 
Thus, for instance, a man may intend the moderate gain 
which he seeks to acquire by trading for the upkeep of his 
household, or for the assistance of the needy; or again, a man may 
take to trade for some public advantage, for instance, lest his 
country lack the necessaries of life, and seek gain, not as an end, 
but as payment for his labor.19 
In this point, Aquinas approaches the ideas of Aristotle, considering that, apart 
from reflecting the factors of labor and expenses, the economic value of a thing 
also reflects the concept of human want or need. Differences of value “were due, 
first of all, to the abilities of goods to satisfy need, and, secondly to the amounts 
 
18 The author explains, however, that if the defects are too obvious, there 
is no need to inform the buyer. 
19 Ibid., art. 4, ad resp. 
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of labour and expenses expended in their production.”20 Also in his comments on 
Aristotle, the theologian argues that “arts and crafts would be doomed to 
destruction if the producer did not recover his outlays in the sale of his product,” 
thus arguing that “the market price could not fall permanently below cost.”21 
Therefore, for Aquinas, the just price cannot be determined with mathematical 
precision, being instead an estimate that takes into account the economic value 
of goods relative to a specific time and place. Moreover, the just price also enjoys 
some elasticity to “vary within a certain range, so that minor deviations do not 
involve any injustice.”22 The example given to illustrate this argument can be 
found in Question 77, Article 3, Objection 4. Here, Aquinas tells a story about a 
merchant who arrives with wheat in a place that faces starvation. The merchant 
knows that other merchants are coming after him with more wheat. Is this 
merchant able to sell the wheat at a higher price due to the scarcity of the good 
or is he bound to tell the truth and to sell the wheat at a lower price than its 
prevailing price? According to Aquinas, the seller “does not seem to act contrary 
to justice through not stating what is going to happen,”23 even though he would 
act virtuously if he chose to do so and lowered the price accordingly. 
As a theologian, Thomas Aquinas understood the just price as justice 
entering the world of commerce, and, probably for that reason, in his thought the 
just price takes precedence over the concept of laesio enormis as a limit to the 
free bargaining of contracts. The concept had traditionally acted as a limitation 
 
20 Baldwin, “The Medieval Theories of the Just Price,” p. 74. 
21 Roover, “The Concept of Just Price,” p. 422. 
22 Ibid., p. 422. 
23 Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, II, II, q. 77, art. 3, ad resp. 
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on the enforcement of agreements that would be deemed to result in abnormal 
harm (laesio enormis) inflicted on one of the parties. But for Aquinas, despite 
allowing for small deviations from the just price without resulting in a fraudulent 
sale, the integral just price (and not any stipulated fraction of it such as half or 
two-thirds) was regarded as the central concept for evaluating the justice of 
transactions. An implication of this is that, of course, computation of the just 
price then becomes a central issue for determining the proper role and scope of 
economic regulation and price controls. For this purpose, as explored in the next 
section, the notion of “common estimation” will play a key role. 
Two additional points unanimously made by medieval authors are the 
rejection of any form of price discrimination to maintain a social hierarchy and 
the understanding of monopoly as “a deleterious practice, inimical to the 
commonweal.”24 All practices adverse to competition were considered to be of a 
criminal nature and “those who escaped conviction in the secular courts were 
still punishable in foro conscientiae,”25 because monopoly profits corresponded 
to turpe lucrum, for which restitution was always required. 
10.3 Catholic Thought on Price Controls after 
the Reformation 
While Christian thought on price controls and market economies naturally had 
many variants, it is safe to say that the Thomistic framework explained in the 
previous section of this chapter was the dominant approach at least until the 
 
24 Roover, “The Concept of Just Price,” p. 426. 
25 Ibid., p. 429. 
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Protestant Reformation. From the Catholic side, the period of the Counter-
Reformation was marked by some notable developments in economic theory as 
well as by important developments in the application of normative concepts of 
justice to prices and their regulation. 
In this period, the work of the late scholastics – particularly those of the 
School of Salamanca – had a central and long-lasting influence in shaping 
Catholic views on prices, the operation of the market economy, and its 
relationship with state controls and regulation.26 The designation “School of 
Salamanca” refers to a distinct group of Iberian scholars of the sixteenth and 
early seventeenth centuries who followed in the footsteps of Francisco de Vitoria 
(c. 1483–1546). These authors – mostly Dominicans and, later, Jesuits – 
employed and expanded the earlier Thomistic framework in order to deal with 
the new economic and political problems that arose in a time of rapid growth of 
business activity and European expansion into the “New World.” 
While for the most part their emphasis is on continuity with earlier 
Christian economic thinking, the Salamanca School combines a more elaborate 
understanding of the functioning of market economies and the role of prices with 
 
26 For an overview of the economic contributions of the late scholastics, 
see Alejandro A. Chafuen, Faith and Liberty: The Economic Thought of the Late 
Scholastics (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2003). Specifically about the School of 
Salamanca, see Marjorie Grice-Hutchison, The School of Salamanca: Readings in 
Spanish Monetary Theory 1544–1605 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952) and 




greater practical skepticism about government intervention in general and price 
controls in particular. As emphasized by Alves and Moreira:27 
One of the key distinguishing features of the Salamanca 
School – and perhaps the most important characteristic of its 
economic thought – is its sophisticated understanding of the 
operation of the market economy. While the late Iberian 
scholastics did not, in most areas, offer a radical break with the 
past, they often put forth a more benevolent view of the 
functioning of the market economy than other earlier and 
contemporary thinkers. This view was also associated with a 
greater awareness of the dangers associated with undue political 
intervention in the market, which raised a broad scope of ethical 
concerns. 
The late scholastics, to a greater extent than anyone before, incorporated into the 
idea of just price notions of supply and demand, as well as what can be regarded 
as an early understanding of the subjective theory of value (which was only 
explicitly and fully defined in economic theory in the second half of the 
nineteenth century).Thus, the founder of the Salamanca School, Francisco de 
Vitoria, describes the operation of market economies and the important role 
played by prices and their relationship with common estimation in the following 
manner: 
 
27 André A. Alves and José M. Moreira, “Business Ethics in the School of 
Salamanca,” in Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics, ed. 
Christoph Luetge (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), p. 216. 
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It follows from this principle that wherever there is a 
marketable good for which there are many buyers, neither the 
nature of the good nor the price for which it was bought, that is 
today, how expensive it was, nor the toil and trouble it was to get it 
should be taken into account. When Peter sells wheat, the buyer 
need not consider the money Peter spent nor his work but, rather, 
the common estimation of how much wheat is worth. If, according 
to commons estimation, the bushel of wheat is worth four silver 
pieces and somebody buys it for three, this would constitute an 
injustice to the seller because the common estimation of a bushel 
of wheat is four silver pieces. In the same way, if that seller were to 
sell at a higher price, taking into account his expenses and his 
work, he would selling unjustly, because he should sell it according 
to the common estimation of the market.28 
Reinforcing his emphasis on the centrality of common estimation achieved 
through voluntary action in the context of the market, Vitoria then immediately 
goes on to clarify that other considerations used to deduce the just price and 
value of a good are only valid until the price has been established through 
common estimation, which should then be respected as the just price. In line 
with Vitoria, Domingo de Soto, another towering figure of the School of 
Salamanca, explains the notion of prices and their connection with utility, 
anticipating (although not in a fully consistent way) developments in economic 
 
28 Quoted in Chafuen, Faith and Liberty, pp. 82–83. 
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theory that would only materialize again in an explicit form much later with the 
so-called marginalist revolution in the nineteenth century: 
The price of things should not be calculated by their nature, 
but by the utility they serve to men. The reason for this conclusion 
is natural; because as the world and everything in it has been made 
for man, the things in common estimation ought to be worth as 
much as they serve men.29 
Or, in the words of another important representative of the school, Diego de 
Covarrubias y Leyva: 
The value of an article does not depend on its essential 
nature but on the estimation of men, even if that estimation be 
foolish. Thus, in the Indies wheat is dearer than in Spain because 
men esteem it more highly, though the nature of the wheat is the 
same in both places.30 
In line with the earlier Christian doctrine on the just price, it was deemed to 
include both the natural price (associated with common estimation in the market 
in the absence of coercion, fraud, monopoly, or monopsony) and the legal price 
(fixed by a legitimate authority, but not arbitrarily, since the price was restricted 
by the need to be in line with the pursuit of the common good). 
Also in line with the earlier doctrine, exceptions were allowed for price 
controls. But distrust was on the rise about the potential ill effects of these 
 
29 Domingo de Soto, De iustitia et iure – facsimile of the 1556 Latin edition 
accompanied with a Spanish translation (Madrid: Instituto de Estúdios Políticos, 
1968 [1556]), book vi, q. ii, a. iii. 
30 Quoted in Marjorie Grice-Hutchison, Early Economic Thought in Spain 
1177–1740 (London: George Allen & Unwin), p. 100. 
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interventions and detrimental unintended consequences of regulation that 
jeopardized the common good. This inspired leading Catholic thinkers of the 
period to issue strong warnings about these risks. While legal prices that shied 
away from common estimation were admitted as valid in principle, skepticism 
about them grew deeper and geared Catholic economic thought in a direction 
that was more receptive to the operation of market economies (in the absence of 
coercion, fraud, monopoly, or monopsony)31 than in earlier periods. 
Elegido offers a useful synthesis of the prevalent views of the School of 
Salamanca on prices and market economies: 
In my view the leading authors of the Salamanca School can 
contribute three key ideas to a modern discussion of justice in 
pricing. They used a substantive standard for assessing the justice 
of exchanges; they claimed that the fundamental standard of 
commutative justice is equivalence in value; and, finally, they 
argued that the best indicator of the value of a good is the price 
that it fetches in an open market.32 
The inclination of the late scholastics (and particularly within the School of 
Salamanca) to be skeptical about government intervention in the market and 
particularly about the imposition of price controls even led Raymond de Roover, 
 
31 These conditions may be seen as the central (although not exclusive) 
tenets of a business culture compatible with Catholic Social Teaching. See André 
Azevedo Alves, Philip Booth, and Barbara Fryzel, “Business Culture and 
Corporate Social Responsibility: An Analysis in the Light of Catholic Social 
Teaching with an Application to Whistle-Blowing,” The Heythrop Journal (April 
2016). 
32 Juan Manuel Elegido, “The Just Price: Three Insights from the 
Salamanca School,” Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 90, no.1 (2009), p. 30. 
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in his highly influential article on the concept of the just price, to consider it a 
weakness on their part: 
One weakness of the scholastic doctors was that they were 
interested only in laying down principles and tended to overlook 
practical difficulties, which, they claimed, did not concern the 
theologians but were the province of the “politicians.” An extreme 
position was taken by Martin Azpilcueta (1493–1587), better 
known as Navarrus, who opposed all price regulation because it 
was unnecessary in times of plenty and ineffective or harmful in 
times of dearth. Several others, among them Molina, looked upon 
price regulation with the same disfavor.33 
A definitive judgment on whether this strong inclination on the part of 
Azpilcueta, Molina, and others ought to be considered a weakness or a strength 
of their analysis will, of course, be largely dependent upon one’s own 
contemporary view about the desirability and usefulness of price controls. But 
regardless of that judgment, it is fair to say that, in this period, Catholic views on 
the subject evolved toward a more favorable view of the operation of 
competitive and open market economies and toward a more skeptical position 
on the adoption of price controls, even if the Catholic thinkers continued to admit 
price controls as being legitimate in principle.34 Although not unchallenged, this 
continues to be the prevailing view emerging from the Catholic tradition and an 
 
33 Roover, “The Concept of the Just Price,” p. 426. 
34 For a more detailed analysis of the late scholastics’ views on price 
controls, see also Chafuen, Faith and Liberty, pp. 85–90. 
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accurate description of other Christian perspectives on price controls and 
market economies. 
10.4 Protestant Thought on Price Controls 
after the Reformation 
10.4.1 The Protestant Reformation and Economic 
Thought 
When the Protestant Reformation began in sixteenth-century Europe, the 
capitalist economic model was not excluded from its criticisms. As Thelma 
McCormack very well explains by referring to the arguments of R. H. Tawney and 
Émile Durkheim, capitalism in its initial form was seen by many as providing 
“economic growth at the expense of social purpose”35 and as suffering from “a 
chronic debilitation of morale in terms of an ethical vacuum, an organic division 
of labour without a larger awareness of interdependency, economic activity 
without a guild ethic.”36 
In this context, and given the apparent inertia of the established Catholic 
Church to address these changes and its consequences, the Reformation started 
 
35 Thelma McCormack, “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Socialism,” 
The British Journal of Sociology, vol. 20, no. 3 (September 1969), p. 266. 
36 Ibid., p. 267. These considerations may be justified by the enormous 
changes capitalism brought, combined with not only the discovery of new routes 
of trade – which included not only the transformation of small villages into big 
cosmopolitan, urban towns and the growth of population with the increasing 
movement of people and goods – but also with important changes in the labor 




as a protest within the Church, with the main objective of trying to “bring order 
out of chaos by providing a new normative framework.”37 This modern norm – 
the Protestant ethic – favored the differentiation of roles in society and the 
interaction among them, this being fundamental to the definition of new roles for 
social participation and the division of labor. Furthermore, the Protestant ethic 
also carried a tradition of Natural Law. This combination began with Hugo 
Grotius in 1625, continued with Pufendorf, Hutcheson, and Adam Smith, and 
provided “the theoretical foundations of political economy,” including “the 
nucleus of value and price theory.”38 (Note: For an exposition of Smith’s, 
Pufendorf’s, and Hutcheson’s views in relation to antitrust, see Chapter 4 by 
Elzinga and Crane.) 
10.4.2 Value and Price Theory in Pufendorf, 
Hutcheson, and Smith 
The main common element concerning the definition of value among the authors 
of this tradition is the determination of just price by using a combination of a 
good’s utility and the costs of labor expended in its production. In 1672, Samuel 
Pufendorf developed his influential theory of value and price in his De Jure 
Naturae et Gentium, where he defines price as being “a moral quality of things 
and actions in so far as they are understood to serve some purpose in common 
life.”39 Three elements can thus be distinguished in the process of defining a 
 
37 Ibid., p. 270. 
38 Jefrey T. Young, “Law and Economics in the Protestant Natural Law 
Tradition: Samuel Pufendorf, Francis Hutcheson, and Adam Smith,” Journal of the 
History of Economic Thought, vol. 30, no.3 (September 2008), p. 283. 
39 Quoted in ibid., p. 284. 
21 
 
certain thing’s price. The first element is subjective valuation. This reflects the 
usefulness of a certain thing for human life or the thing’s ability to contribute to a 
more pleasant life.40 Scarcity is the second element. It is perhaps the most 
important one when considering high prices, since there is a tendency for price 
to be lower when quantity is greater, even with things “which men are least able 
to do without.”41 The last element is the process of production, which reflects the 
complexity of the cost factors involved in the making of the thing. These factors 
include, among others, the difficulty of the production, the quantity of workers 
needed, and the positions they occupy. 
As for the contexts in which prices can be formed, Pufendorf explains that, 
in the state of nature, where transactions occur only occasionally, prices are 
agreed between the parts involved in the transaction. In organized states, 
 
40 In this point, however, Pufendorf recognizes that there are some things 
that, despite having no price, are extremely useful for human life, namely, things 
that “are and should be exempt from dominion” (e.g., the air and the open 
ocean), things that “are removed from commerce by law and/or custom” (e.g., 
sacred sites or articles), and things that “cannot be held separately, although 
they are accessory to things the price of which they influence” (e.g., a beautiful 
landscape) (quoted in ibid., p. 294). Following Pufendorf’s rationale, Hutcheson 
also enumerates some objects for which prices cannot be determined, such as 
those things “naturally destined for community, or cannot come into commerce 
but as appendages of something else” (Francis Hutcheson, Philosophiae moralis 
institution compendiaria, with A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy 
(Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2007), p. 280, 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/2059). 
41 Quoted in Young, “Law and Economics in the Protestant Natural Law 
Tradition,” p. 285. Adam Smith also associates the idea of scarcity with that of 
price and property when he recognizes that the air, the running water, and the 
sea cannot be owned because “they cannot be lessened or impaired by use, nor 
can anyone be injured by the use of them.” Adam Smith, Lectures on Justice, 
Police, Revenue and Arms (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), i.60. 
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however, prices can be set either by authorities or “by the general valuation and 
judgement of men, with the further consent of those who are the parties to 
bargain.”42 When the determination of the price follows a consented judgment of 
men, the established price is known as “common or natural price,” which is taken 
as the just price. In this case, the merchant is allowed to reflect in the price the 
costs of labor and expenses borne to obtain the product, being thus able to sell 
more dearly and to profit from the sale of a product without violating the just 
price: 
But merchants can include in their estimation the time they 
have spent, the plans they have formed, and the troubles they have 
met in acquiring, preserving, or distributing their merchandise, as 
well as all necessary expenses for the labour of their servants … it 
would surely be inhuman, and likely to destroy the industry of 
men, to try to allow a man for his business, or any other sort of 
occupation, no more profit than barely permits him to meet his 
necessities by frugality and hardships.43 
Some decades after Pufendorf developed his theory, Francis Hutcheson 
developed his own account of value and price in two of his works, System of 
Moral Philosophy (1747) and A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy (1755), 
in which he recognized the contribution by Pufendorf. According to Hutcheson, 
prices are determined by an equal influence of the elements of demand and 
supply. The author places a special emphasis put on the latter, which he refers to 
 
42 Quoted in Young, “Law and Economics in the Protestant Natural Law 
Tradition,” p. 285. 
43 Quoted in ibid., p. 285. 
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as “difficulty.” The supply that determines the price thus reflects effort expended 
and includes not only the quantity of the good, but also subjective factors such as 
the toil required for production, the genius or ingenuity of the producer, and 
even the life standards of the merchant: 
From what we said about the grounds of price, ’tis plain that 
in estimating the values of goods {in any place}, we are not only to 
compute the disbursement made in buying, importing, and keeping 
them safe, with the interest of money thus employed; but also the 
pains and care of the merchant; the value of which is to be 
estimated according to the reputable condition in which such men 
live, and to be added to the other charges upon the goods. This 
price of the merchant’s labour <and care> is the foundation of the 
ordinary profit of merchants.44 
For Adam Smith, an account of the theory of value and price can be found in his 
conception of justice. Under the designation of “natural price,” Smith sees the just 
price as a combination of the utility of the good with all the aspects involved in 
its creation. In the beaver and deer story that the author tells in his Wealth of 
Nations, he introduces the notion of the right to the fruits of one’s labor with the 
claim that the hunter shall receive something in return for his labor.45 This right 
is also seen as a form of equity – another important concept presented by Smith 
 
44 Hutcheson, Philosophiae moralis, p. 284. 
45 In Adam Smith’s own words: “the property which every man has in his 
own labour, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most 
sacred and inviolable” (Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of 
the Wealth of Nations (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1976): I.x.c.12). 
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in his Lectures on Jurisprudence – which is related to retributive justice, even 
being used synonymously with the concept of natural justice: 
Servants, labourers, and workmen of different kinds, make 
up the far greater part of every great political society. But what 
improves the circumstances of the greater part can never be 
regarded as an inconveniency to the whole. No society can surely 
be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the 
members are poor and miserable. It is but equity, besides, that 
they who feed, cloath and lodge the whole body of the people, 
should have such a share of the produce of their own labour as to 
be themselves tolerably well fed, cloathed and lodged.46 
Under the influence of and inspired by the notion of price as defined by Samuel 
Pufendorf and Francis Hutcheson,47 Smith goes beyond those two authors and 
elaborates on situations where price controls should be implemented. 
The most known example of this kind of mechanism can be found on the 
market for loans, where Smith clearly favors the imposition of a price ceiling on 
interest rates. This usury law – as it is commonly called – aimed mainly to reduce 
the flow of high-risk loans and increase the availability of money to be borrowed 
by “sober” and “prudent” men. According to Smith, the absence of a legal rate 
ceiling would result in higher interest rates and would consequently concentrate 
 
46 Ibid., I.viii.36. 
47 This influence is extensively explored by Andrew Skinner, “Pufendorf, 
Hutcheson and Adam Smith: Some Principles of Political Economy,” Scottish 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 42, no. 2 (May 1995), pp. 165–182, or by Enzo 
Pesciarelli, “Aspects of the Influence of Francis Hutcheson on Adam Smith,” 
History of Political Economy, vol. 31, no. 3 (1999), pp. 525–545. 
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loans in the hands of “prodigals and projectors,” who would be likely to use it for 
speculative and unproductive investments. Following this rationale, Smith 
proposes the legal rate “to be somewhat above,” but not “much above the lowest 
market rate,” so as to have “a great part of the capital of the country … thrown 
into the hands in which it is most likely to be employed with advantage.”48 By 
defining the interest rate ceiling slightly above the market price, Smith’s main 
intention was to reduce incentives for high-risk loans, since, with low interest 
rates, high-risk lenders would not receive the full risk premium of the loans 
required to make them feasible.49 
Smith was also in favor of regulations in the banking sector. His main 
commentators justify this by reference to two events in Scotland that shaped 
Smith’s economic thinking: The “small note mania” and the Ayr Bank Crisis.50 
Having recognized the dangers posed by those situations and wishing to prevent 
them from occurring in the future, Adam Smith suggested two main regulating 
 
48 Smith, Wealth of Nations, II.iv.15. 
49 Adam Smith’s perspective on the market for loans and on usury laws is 
thoroughly analyzed by Joseph M. Jadlow, “Adam Smith on Usury Laws,” The 
Journal of Finance, vol. 32, no. 4 (September 1977), pp. 1195–1200. 
50 As explained by Hugh Rockoff, “Adam Smith on Money, Banking, and 
the Price Level,” in The Oxford Handbook of Adam Smith, eds. Christopher J. 
Berry, Maria Pia Paganelli, and Craig Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), pp. 307–332, these two shocks had a significant impact on the Scottish 
banking system, as well as repercussions on international financial institutions, 
having resulted in a “V-shape” economic recession. The “small notes mania” was 
characterized by the issuing of “redeemable notes for very small sums of money,” 
while the Ayr Bank Crisis refers to a financial crisis in 1772 – “the first modern 
banking panic faced by the Bank of England” – on which Ayr Bank was “at the 
very epicentre of the boom, and was the trigger of the subsequent crash” that 




tools. The first corresponded to the real bills doctrine, according to which banks 
should only issue money in exchange for short-term real bills. The second 
consisted of a prohibition of small notes – for Smith considered this practice to 
have a speculative character and that it penalized poor people.51 
Smith himself recognized that these kinds of controls were exceptions to 
his main theory of natural liberty and laissez faire, but he considered them 
necessary for assuring a greater good: 
Such regulations may, no doubt, be considered as in some 
respects a violation of natural liberty. But those exertions of the 
natural liberty of a few individuals, which might endanger the 
security of the whole society, are, and ought to be, restrained by 
the laws of all governments, of the most free as well as of the most 
despotical. The obligation of building party walls, in order to 
prevent the communication of fire, is a violation of natural liberty 
exactly of the same kind with the regulations with the regulations 
of the banking trade which are here proposed.52 
 
51 “Where the issuing of bank notes for such very small sums is allowed 
and commonly practised, many mean people are both enabled and encouraged to 
become bankers…. But the frequent bankruptcies to which such beggarly 
bankers must be liable, may occasion a very considerable inconveniency, and 
sometimes even a very great calamity to many poor people who had received 
their notes in payment” (Smith, Wealth of Nations, II.ii.90). 
52 Ibid., II.i.94. 
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10.5 Luther and Price Theory 
Martin Luther is a prominent figure in Protestant thought. His importance and 
influence in European history during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is 
undeniable, with his intellectual impact lasting well into the present day through 
Protestantism. His economic theory is founded on the Christian virtue of charity, 
with a particular emphasis given to the seventh commandment – you shall not 
steal – “which extends that subject from regular theft to the idea of relieving a 
person of his property against his will by furtive practices in the marketplace.”53 
Despite recognizing its necessary character, Luther had an ambiguous attitude 
regarding trade. He considered that buying and selling would always turn people 
into victims of greed, “for businessmen will cheat and lie.”54 Given this 
inevitability, Luther believed that the only solution for the greedy disposition of 
merchants was to have prices determined by the estimation of wise and honest 
men appointed by temporal authorities. According to this theory, developed in 
On Trade and Usury, the just price would be based on the real cost of the 
product, combined with the necessary profit for the merchant to continue his 
economic activity and sustain his family. In the absence of fixed prices, the just 
price would be the one decided in the common market: 
It is fair and right that a merchant make as much profit on 
his wares as will cover his cost and pay him for his trouble, his 
labor, and his risk … one can truly give you no instructions but 
 
53 Odd Langholm, “Martin Luther’s Doctrine on Trade and Price in Its 
Literary Context,” History of Political Economy, vol. 41, no. 1 (2009), p. 92. 
54 Ibid., p. 94. 
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leave it to your conscience to be careful not to overcharge your 
neighbor by your greed but seek your modest living.55 
Influenced by pre-Reformation Catholic ideas, Luther also condemned the 
practices of fraud, understood as “fooling the opposite party,”56 and economic 
coercion, seen as “exploiting the need of the opposite party in order to obtain 
more favorable terms of exchange.”57 As for collusion and monopoly, the critique 
is absolute. Luther considers that those who engage in trade just to control the 
supply or price of certain goods and to make money in that manner are “un-
Christian,” practice “selfish business,” and “should not be tolerated.”58 
In general, the Protestant tradition’s theory of value and price defends the 
just price as an arrangement that combines cost estimates with a fair profit for 
merchants. Furthermore, the claims for compensation associated with cost 
elements are grounded in the account of natural property rights and markets. 
And the exchange of goods is understood as “embedded in social institutions” 
and as “a form of human interaction and cooperation,” which is essential for men 
to live in a peaceful society.59 
Within this Protestant natural-law tradition, it becomes possible to 
distinguish the perspective of the political economists (including Samuel 
 
55 Quoted in ibid., p. 96. 
56 According to Luther, the most common forms of fraud included: “using 
false weights, measures or coins; overestimating merchandise; overcharging 
customers; selling false or bad merchandise; taking advantage of customers by 
nimbleness, queer finances, or dexterous tricks” (quoted in ibid., p. 98). 
57 Ibid., p. 92. 
58 Quoted in ibid., p. 103. 




Pufendorf, Francis Hutcheson, and Adam Smith) from Martin Luther’s point of 
view. While the former have a more positive view of the market economy, the 
latter aligns with a more restrictive and distrustful vision of commercial 
exchanges. 
10.6 Conclusion 
As one would expect, contemporary Christians’ views on mechanisms of price 
control are largely shaped by the positions developed centuries ago, with a 
special emphasis on the Thomist framework and its contribution of the definition 
of the justum pretium. 
In the more heterogeneous context of Protestant denominations, there is 
naturally a greater variety of positions regarding this theme. Some have a more 
positive perspective of the market economy, while others argue in favor of 
greater restrictions and take a more skeptical opinion about commercial 
transactions. A detailed analysis of this heterogeneity would go vastly beyond 
the scope and possibilities of this chapter, but we should nevertheless 
acknowledge it. 
Although there are various Catholic views on price controls, Catholic 
positions on the subject have a more easily discernible central core. This is not 
only because there is greater unity and centralization in the Catholic Church but 
also because of the orientations provided by the Catechism. The general 
framework of the idea of price controls and market economies is built upon 
earlier advances in Catholic thought. It can be found in John Paul II’s encyclical 
letter Centesimus Annus, 32: “A person who produces something other than for 
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his own use generally does so in order that others may use it after they have paid 
a just price, mutually agreed upon through free bargaining.” Additionally, one of 
the most significant references appears in the discussion of the seventh 
commandment: 
The seventh commandment forbids theft, that is, usurping 
another’s property against the reasonable will of the owner.60 
Even if it does not contradict the provisions of civil law, any 
form of unjustly taking and keeping the property of others is 
against the seventh commandment: thus, deliberate retention of 
goods lent or of objects lost; business fraud; paying unjust wages; 
forcing up prices by taking advantage of the ignorance or hardship 
of another. The following are also morally illicit: speculation in 
which one contrives to manipulate the price of goods artificially in 
order to gain an advantage to the detriment of others; […].61 
In Centesimus Annus, it is also possible to identify certain specific circumstances 
where the regulation of prices appears to be suggested, even though it does not 
necessarily imply price controls imposed by the state: 
The State, however, has the task of determining the juridical 
framework within which economic affairs are to be conducted, and 
thus of safeguarding the prerequisites of a free economy, which 
presumes a certain equality between the parties, such that one 
 
60 Catechism of the Catholic Church, p. 2408. 
61 Ibid., p. 2409. 
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party would not be so powerful as practically to reduce the other 
to subservience.62 
These specific circumstances, however, cannot be defined a priori and are not 
independent of judgment on economic theory, as they will be fundamental to 
evaluate implications of both prices and regulation on the common good. In 
order to analyze these particular cases that may justify some sort of intervention, 
more detailed and in-depth studies and analyses are necessary.63 
Perhaps the best way to synthesize the Christian position on price 
controls (to the extent a common Christian position can be ascertained) is in 
terms of a general inclination to respect the just price. The just price is mostly 
understood in contemporary terms as the free market price voluntarily agreed 
upon by the parties in the absence of fraud, coercion, or situations of extreme 
need. This implicitly recommends against any form of controls on prices that 
respect those basic conditions. At the same time, there is a recognition that in 
certain relatively exceptional situations, the prices set by private actors may be 
in violation of the seventh commandment and, for that reason, may justify (or 
even require) the regulation of prices. 
 
 
62 Centesimus Annus, p. 15. 
63 A good example is Debra Wilson, “Price Gouging, Construction Cartels 
or Repair Monopolies? Competition Law Issues Following Natural Disasters,” 
Canterbury Law Review, vol. 20 (2014), pp. 53–90. 
